SECOND AMENDMENT
Cuffed In The Cockpit
America's armed pilot program seems stuck at the gate. Why?
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The Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) armed airline pilots program has been troubled by inadequate training and low pilot participation--just normal growing pains. But the situation has gone from bad to worse. The flying public is no safer now than it was before the FFDO program began.
The FFDO program's fundamental goal is to provide appropriately screened and trained pilots with firearms to defend the cockpits of their aircraft against unauthorized entry. For some inexplicable reason, the Bush Administration fought to prevent the establishment of the FFDO program. Fortunately, Congress spoke, and the FFDO program became law. Unfortunately, it soon became apparent that the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), which oversees the FFDO, had no intention of complying with Congressional direction about how to establish and administer the program.
In the post-9/11 scramble to beef up security, one of the first safeguards deployed was armored cockpit doors. While this is certainly better than an unarmored door, it soon became apparent that additional defenses were needed. One news report said that a United Airlines cleaning crew accidentally smashed their heavy cart into an armored cockpit door, and its hinges popped off. The apparent vulnerability of these cockpit doors is not likely to be lost on an alert terrorist.
Trained pilots armed with pistols would markedly improve security against potential terrorists. But a pilot cannot effectively use a gun if he cannot gain access to it in a matter of seconds. That could be difficult, given the way TSA has structured the FFDO gun-handling-and-storage protocol. Unlike other armed federal law enforcement officers, FFDOs must keep their guns in locked containers inside nondescript luggage. This raises a number of problems. For instance, baggage handlers have already lost an estimated 300 FFDO firearms. Even if an FFDO manages to get his firearm successfully aboard the aircraft, he only has access to it when he is actually in the cockpit. If he leaves the cockpit for any reason, he must lock the gun in its container. The unarmed pilot then becomes vulnerable; the co-pilot or any other flight-deck officer could not gain access to the gun.
There are some 130 federal agencies that employ armed officers, including the Bureau Of Engraving and Printing, Fish And Wildlife Service, Library Of Congress, the Peace Corps and the Postal Service. Unlike the FFDOs, these officers are allowed to carry weapons concealed and available for immediate use. However, it's not clear that these armed officers are authorized to use their weapons aboard an airliner. The TSA has stipulated that an FFDO pilot may only use his weapon inside the cockpit. Consequently, it's simple to imagine a scenario in which several armed federal officers are on an airliner, but none of them is allowed (let alone trained) to use his weapon. This absurd tangle of laws and regulations binding both FFDOs and other armed federal officers is public knowledge.
The TSA has further hamstrung the FFDO program with a grievously flawed screening and training process. Even though all FAA-licensed pilots must already undergo routine periodical psychological evaluations, the TSA has laid on additional extraordinary psychological testing requirements for FFDO applicants, including a three-hour written psychological test followed by a long interview with a TSA psychologist. The TSA says this testing is necessary because "the gun is a distraction," and "we must ensure that the pilot is capable of landing the aircraft after using lethal force."
The Airline Pilots Security Association (APSA) has done yeoman work in the support of arming pilots and has collected numerous first-person accounts from pilots who have been through the FFDO evaluation and training process. A pilot who is also a retired Air Force colonel said, "The Air Force considered me psychologically sound enough to be directly responsible for nuclear weapons. Yet a TSA psychologist has determined that I'm unreliable to carry a weapon on my own airliner."
A military reserve pilot who flies F-16s as well as airliners was asked by a TSA psychologist if he thought he could shoot someone if necessary. This pilot flies lethal fighter jets and carries a sidearm while on reserve duty, and he answered the psychologist's question in the affirmative. He was inexplicably dropped from the FFDO program.
Even if an FFDO applicant makes it through psychological testing, he's still at risk for dismissal at any time without any explanation. One FFDO trainee--a retired Air Force colonel with 25 years experience as a commercial pilot, who held high Air Force security clearances and had access to nuclear weapons, was a fighter wing commander and a military firearms instructor--washed out of the FFDO program with no reason given. Another trainee was a federal law enforcement officer for 23 years and held high security clearances and trained at the FBI Academy. He was almost done with the FFDO training and was expelled one hour before course completion without explanation, he said.
Most FFDO applicants and trainees who are failed receive the same generic rejection letter: "Based on the TSA's evaluation during the selection process, you do not meet the criteria for participation in the FFDO program... You may not appeal this decision..."
One rejected pilot eloquently expressed his frustrations to the APSA: "The same administration that is dragging its feet in executing the will of Congress to arm airline pilots is hysterical about the possible dangers of armed pilots..."
APSA President Captain David Mackett laid blame for the stumbling FFDO program squarely at the feet of TSA. "Great strides could be made in improving the program," he said, "if the TSA were not so blatantly antagonistic to it."
Some members of Congress who supported original FFDO legislation thought they had heard just about enough. Then they read news reports about an intimidating e-mail message TSA allegedly sent to some FFDOs who had complained about the program. The message reportedly said, "Recent public disclosure of SSI (Sensitive Security Information) by FFDOs in the media, to law enforcement gatherings and [to] Congressmen is most alarming and a serious breach of security."
The last thing you want to do in Washington is tell someone they should not talk to Congress--it's like waving a red flag in front of a bull. Partly in response to the offensive e-mail message, several members of Congress drafted The Cockpit Security Technical Questions And Improvements Act of 2004, a bill that would essentially strip TSA of most of its authority over the FFDO program. The legislation has about 50 House co-sponsors, including Rep. Dan Mica (R-FL), chairman of the powerful Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation And Infrastructure Committee. An identical companion bill has been prepared for Senate introduction by Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY).
The Cockpit Security Act would radically simplify and redirect FFDO selection, training and implementation. Any commercial pilot with an FAA license who is not prohibited by federal law from carrying a firearm would automatically be approved as an FFDO. All FFDOs would have to complete an approved firearms-training course before being officially sworn in. Unlike the current situation, in which TSA firearms training is offered at only one location in New Mexico, a number of private U.S. training facilities would be certified to train FFDOs.
The legislation would also put many more FFDOs in the air. There are approximately 100,000 commercial pilots in the U.S.; fewer than 800 are currently FFDOs. At any one time, there are only about 300 FFDOs to cover some 35,000 daily flights in the U.S. The bill would provide that all airline pilots who have active, retired or reserve military status and who have had military firearms training would be automatically approved as active FFDOs. These pilots would be required to complete an approved firearms instruction program within 120 days of appointment. About 70 percent of all airline pilots have prior military experience. The automatic-appointment provision would also apply to pilots who are active or retired law enforcement officers.
One of the legislation's most critical provisions addresses the nonsensical firearms lockbox requirement. Under the bill, FFDOs would be permitted to carry concealed firearms in the same manner as other federal officers. They would also be allowed to use their firearms outside the cockpit if the need arose.
On any given flight, there may be one or more armed federal officers riding as passengers. There is currently no single chain of command for these officers. The Cockpit Security Act would stipulate that if the pilot of the aircraft is an FFDO, he is automatically the senior federal law enforcement officer on the plane. The legislation would also allow any FFDO to disclose any information about the FFDO program to any member of Congress. This provision would measurably improve Congressional oversight of the FFDO program.
There's no guarantee that the Cockpit Security Act will pass Congress and be signed by the president. But even without new legislation, Congress still controls the purse strings for the TSA and the FFDO program. That authority can and should be used.
